增强后台登录安全与密码策略

This commit is contained in:
liuwei
2026-04-30 15:32:41 +08:00
parent 2d5a5547de
commit cb99e94493
6 changed files with 342 additions and 26 deletions

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,33 @@
from flask import Blueprint, render_template, request, redirect, url_for, session, current_app, jsonify
from functools import wraps
from loguru import logger
import time
# 创建认证蓝图
auth_bp = Blueprint('auth', __name__)
def _is_ajax_request() -> bool:
"""判断当前请求是否由前端异步发起。"""
requested_with = str(request.headers.get("X-Requested-With", "") or "").strip().lower()
accept_header = str(request.headers.get("Accept", "") or "").strip().lower()
return requested_with == "xmlhttprequest" or "application/json" in accept_header
# 登录检查装饰器
def login_required(f):
@wraps(f)
def decorated_function(*args, **kwargs):
if not session.get('logged_in'):
return redirect(url_for('auth.login'))
server = current_app.dashboard_server
session_timeout_seconds = int(server.get_auth_policy().get("session_timeout_minutes", 480) * 60)
last_activity_at = float(session.get("last_activity_at") or 0.0)
if last_activity_at > 0 and (time.time() - last_activity_at) > session_timeout_seconds:
# 会话超时后统一清理登录态,避免长期闲置会话继续可用。
session.clear()
return redirect(url_for('auth.login'))
session["last_activity_at"] = time.time()
return f(*args, **kwargs)
return decorated_function
@@ -25,10 +41,18 @@ def login():
# 使用 strip 规避用户误输入首尾空格导致的误判。
username = str(request.form.get('username', '') or '').strip()
password = str(request.form.get('password', '') or '')
remote_ip = request.remote_addr or ""
# 从应用上下文获取服务器实例,而不是从蓝图对象
server = current_app.dashboard_server
admin_db = getattr(server, "admin_account_db", None)
lock_status = server.get_login_lock_status(username, remote_ip)
if lock_status.get("locked"):
wait_seconds = int(lock_status.get("remaining_seconds") or 0)
error = f"登录失败次数过多,请在 {wait_seconds} 秒后再试"
if _is_ajax_request():
return jsonify({"success": False, "error": error}), 429
return render_template('login.html', error=error)
# 优先使用数据库账号体系鉴权;若不可用则回退旧配置模式,保证兼容存量部署。
login_ok = False
@@ -45,12 +69,29 @@ def login():
login_ok = (username == server.username and password == server.password)
if login_ok:
server.clear_login_failures(username, remote_ip)
session['logged_in'] = True
session.permanent = True
session['username'] = username # 存储用户名到session
session['last_activity_at'] = time.time()
# 若账号仍在使用默认/弱口令,则登录后强提示修改密码。
session['force_password_change'] = bool(server.should_force_password_change(username))
logger.debug(f"Login successful. Session after login: {dict(session)}")
if _is_ajax_request():
return jsonify({"success": True, "redirect_url": url_for('main.index')})
return redirect(url_for('main.index'))
else:
error = '用户名或密码错误'
lock_status = server.mark_login_failure(username, remote_ip)
if lock_status.get("locked"):
wait_seconds = int(lock_status.get("remaining_seconds") or 0)
error = f"登录失败次数过多,请在 {wait_seconds} 秒后再试"
else:
remaining = max(0, int(server.get_auth_policy().get("max_failed_attempts", 5)) - int(lock_status.get("failed_count") or 0))
error = '用户名或密码错误'
if remaining > 0:
error = f"{error},再失败 {remaining} 次将暂时锁定"
if _is_ajax_request():
return jsonify({"success": False, "error": error}), 400
return render_template('login.html', error=error)
@@ -58,11 +99,23 @@ def login():
# 登出
@auth_bp.route('/logout')
def logout():
session.pop('logged_in', None)
session.pop('username', None) # 同时删除username
session.clear()
return redirect(url_for('auth.login'))
@auth_bp.route('/api/auth/security_status', methods=['GET'])
@login_required
def get_security_status():
"""返回当前登录管理员的安全状态。"""
return jsonify({
"success": True,
"data": {
"force_password_change": bool(session.get("force_password_change", False)),
"session_timeout_minutes": int(current_app.dashboard_server.get_auth_policy().get("session_timeout_minutes", 480)),
}
})
@auth_bp.route('/api/auth/change_password', methods=['POST'])
@login_required
def change_password():
@@ -95,13 +148,13 @@ def change_password():
if new_password != confirm_password:
return jsonify({"success": False, "error": "两次输入的新密码不一致"}), 400
# 密码长度做基础约束,避免过弱口令。
if len(new_password) < 6:
return jsonify({"success": False, "error": "新密码长度不能少于6位"}), 400
if new_password == old_password:
return jsonify({"success": False, "error": "新密码不能与旧密码相同"}), 400
password_error = admin_db.validate_password_strength(new_password)
if password_error:
return jsonify({"success": False, "error": password_error}), 400
try:
if not admin_db.verify_admin_password(username, old_password):
return jsonify({"success": False, "error": "旧密码错误"}), 400
@@ -110,6 +163,8 @@ def change_password():
if not updated:
return jsonify({"success": False, "error": "密码更新失败,请稍后重试"}), 500
# 密码修改成功后,移除“必须修改密码”的会话提示。
session["force_password_change"] = False
return jsonify({"success": True, "message": "密码修改成功"})
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"修改后台密码失败: username={username}, error={e}")

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@
import os
import sys
import threading
import time
import secrets
from datetime import timedelta
import toml
from flask import Flask, send_from_directory
@@ -42,6 +45,12 @@ class DashboardServer:
self.LOG = logger
self.LOG.info(f"Dashboard配置加载完成: 服务器将运行在 {self.host}:{self.port}")
# 登录失败限流兜底缓存:
# 1. 优先尝试 Redis但为了兼容 Redis 暂不可用的场景,这里保留进程内兜底;
# 2. 字典内容只保存短期登录失败窗口,不用于持久化;
# 3. 线程化 WSGI 会并发访问,因此需要显式加锁。
self._auth_runtime_lock = threading.Lock()
self._auth_failures = {}
# 如果提供了robot实例则使用其对象
if robot_instance:
self.db_manager = robot_instance.db_manager
@@ -135,9 +144,30 @@ class DashboardServer:
# 指定模板文件夹路径
template_folder = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), 'templates')
app = Flask(__name__, template_folder=template_folder)
app.secret_key = "stats_dashboard_secret_key"
auth_config = self.config.get("auth", {}) or {}
session_timeout_minutes = int(auth_config.get("session_timeout_minutes", 480) or 480)
cookie_secure = bool(auth_config.get("cookie_secure", False))
configured_secret = str(
os.environ.get("ABOT_DASHBOARD_SECRET_KEY")
or auth_config.get("secret_key", "")
or ""
).strip()
if configured_secret:
app.secret_key = configured_secret
else:
# 若未显式配置 secret_key则每次进程启动生成随机值
# 1. 这比固定硬编码密钥安全得多;
# 2. 代价是服务重启后旧 session 会失效,作为安全兜底是可接受的;
# 3. 同时输出 warning提醒后续最好通过配置或环境变量固定注入。
app.secret_key = secrets.token_hex(32)
self.LOG.warning("未配置 Dashboard secret_key已使用进程级随机密钥重启后现有登录会失效")
# 禁用模板缓存使修改HTML文件后立即生效 False =重启才生效
app.config['TEMPLATES_AUTO_RELOAD'] = True
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = str(auth_config.get("cookie_samesite", "Lax") or "Lax")
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = cookie_secure
app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = timedelta(minutes=max(15, session_timeout_minutes))
# 设置Werkzeug日志级别为DEBUG
import logging
@@ -175,6 +205,119 @@ class DashboardServer:
return app
def get_auth_policy(self) -> dict:
"""读取后台认证策略配置。"""
auth_config = self.config.get("auth", {}) or {}
return {
"max_failed_attempts": max(3, int(auth_config.get("max_failed_attempts", 5) or 5)),
"lock_seconds": max(60, int(auth_config.get("lock_seconds", 900) or 900)),
"session_timeout_minutes": max(15, int(auth_config.get("session_timeout_minutes", 480) or 480)),
}
@staticmethod
def _build_login_guard_key(username: str, remote_ip: str) -> str:
"""构建登录限流键。"""
return f"{str(username or '').strip().lower()}::{str(remote_ip or '').strip() or 'unknown'}"
def _get_login_failure_record(self, guard_key: str) -> dict:
"""读取登录失败记录,优先 Redis失败时回退到进程内缓存。"""
try:
redis_conn = self.db_manager.get_redis_connection()
raw_value = redis_conn.get(f"dashboard:auth:fail:{guard_key}")
if raw_value:
parts = str(raw_value).split("|", 1)
return {
"count": int(parts[0] or 0),
"first_failed_at": float(parts[1] or 0) if len(parts) > 1 else 0.0,
}
except Exception:
pass
with self._auth_runtime_lock:
record = dict(self._auth_failures.get(guard_key, {}) or {})
expire_at = float(record.get("expire_at") or 0.0)
if expire_at > 0 and expire_at <= time.time():
self._auth_failures.pop(guard_key, None)
record = {}
return {
"count": int(record.get("count") or 0),
"first_failed_at": float(record.get("first_failed_at") or 0.0),
}
def _save_login_failure_record(self, guard_key: str, count: int, first_failed_at: float, ttl_seconds: int) -> None:
"""保存登录失败记录,优先 Redis失败时回退到进程内缓存。"""
payload = f"{int(count)}|{float(first_failed_at)}"
try:
redis_conn = self.db_manager.get_redis_connection()
redis_conn.setex(f"dashboard:auth:fail:{guard_key}", ttl_seconds, payload)
return
except Exception:
pass
expire_at = time.time() + ttl_seconds
with self._auth_runtime_lock:
self._auth_failures[guard_key] = {
"count": int(count),
"first_failed_at": float(first_failed_at),
"expire_at": expire_at,
}
def clear_login_failures(self, username: str, remote_ip: str) -> None:
"""清理登录失败记录。"""
guard_key = self._build_login_guard_key(username, remote_ip)
try:
redis_conn = self.db_manager.get_redis_connection()
redis_conn.delete(f"dashboard:auth:fail:{guard_key}")
except Exception:
pass
with self._auth_runtime_lock:
self._auth_failures.pop(guard_key, None)
def get_login_lock_status(self, username: str, remote_ip: str) -> dict:
"""获取当前账号/IP 组合的登录锁定状态。"""
policy = self.get_auth_policy()
record = self._get_login_failure_record(self._build_login_guard_key(username, remote_ip))
count = int(record.get("count") or 0)
first_failed_at = float(record.get("first_failed_at") or 0.0)
if count < policy["max_failed_attempts"] or first_failed_at <= 0:
return {"locked": False, "remaining_seconds": 0, "failed_count": count}
elapsed = max(0, int(time.time() - first_failed_at))
remaining_seconds = max(0, policy["lock_seconds"] - elapsed)
if remaining_seconds <= 0:
self.clear_login_failures(username, remote_ip)
return {"locked": False, "remaining_seconds": 0, "failed_count": 0}
return {"locked": True, "remaining_seconds": remaining_seconds, "failed_count": count}
def mark_login_failure(self, username: str, remote_ip: str) -> dict:
"""记录一次登录失败,并返回最新锁定状态。"""
policy = self.get_auth_policy()
guard_key = self._build_login_guard_key(username, remote_ip)
record = self._get_login_failure_record(guard_key)
count = int(record.get("count") or 0)
first_failed_at = float(record.get("first_failed_at") or 0.0)
now_ts = time.time()
if first_failed_at <= 0:
first_failed_at = now_ts
count += 1
self._save_login_failure_record(guard_key, count, first_failed_at, policy["lock_seconds"])
return self.get_login_lock_status(username, remote_ip)
def should_force_password_change(self, username: str) -> bool:
"""判断当前管理员是否应该被强制提示修改密码。"""
admin_db = getattr(self, "admin_account_db", None)
if admin_db and admin_db.is_using_risky_password(username):
return True
# 数据库体系不可用时,再回退配置值判断,至少把默认 admin/admin123 识别出来。
fallback_username = str(self.username or "").strip()
fallback_password = str(self.password or "").strip()
return (
str(username or "").strip() == fallback_username
and fallback_password in getattr(admin_db, "RISKY_PASSWORDS", {"admin123", "admin"})
)
def _register_blueprints(self, app):
"""注册所有蓝图"""
# 在函数内部导入蓝图,避免循环导入

View File

@@ -929,6 +929,9 @@
:visible.sync="passwordDialogVisible"
width="460px"
:close-on-click-modal="false"
:close-on-press-escape="!passwordDialogLocked"
:show-close="!passwordDialogLocked"
:before-close="handlePasswordDialogBeforeClose"
custom-class="password-dialog">
<el-form
ref="passwordFormRef"
@@ -939,17 +942,17 @@
<el-input v-model="passwordForm.old_password" type="password" show-password autocomplete="off" placeholder="请输入当前密码"></el-input>
</el-form-item>
<el-form-item label="新密码" prop="new_password">
<el-input v-model="passwordForm.new_password" type="password" show-password autocomplete="off" placeholder="至少6位"></el-input>
<el-input v-model="passwordForm.new_password" type="password" show-password autocomplete="off" placeholder="至少8位建议字母+数字/符号组合"></el-input>
</el-form-item>
<el-form-item label="确认新密码" prop="confirm_password">
<el-input v-model="passwordForm.confirm_password" type="password" show-password autocomplete="off" placeholder="请再次输入新密码"></el-input>
</el-form-item>
</el-form>
<div class="password-dialog-tip">
提示:修改成功后将立即生效,建议使用强密码(字母、数字、符号组合)。
提示:修改成功后将立即生效,建议使用强密码(至少 8 位,且包含两类以上字符)。
</div>
<span slot="footer" class="dialog-footer">
<el-button @click="passwordDialogVisible = false">取消</el-button>
<el-button v-if="!passwordDialogLocked" @click="passwordDialogVisible = false">取消</el-button>
<el-button type="primary" :loading="passwordSubmitting" @click="submitPasswordChange">确认修改</el-button>
</span>
</el-dialog>
@@ -1043,6 +1046,7 @@
navGroups: NAV_GROUPS,
// 账号密码修改弹窗状态。
passwordDialogVisible: false,
passwordDialogLocked: false,
passwordSubmitting: false,
passwordForm: {
old_password: '',
@@ -1055,7 +1059,22 @@
],
new_password: [
{ required: true, message: '请输入新密码', trigger: 'blur' },
{ min: 6, message: '新密码长度至少6位', trigger: 'blur' }
{ min: 8, message: '新密码长度至少8位', trigger: 'blur' },
{
validator: function(rule, value, callback) {
const passwordText = String(value || '');
let score = 0;
if (/[A-Za-z]/.test(passwordText)) score += 1;
if (/\d/.test(passwordText)) score += 1;
if (/[^A-Za-z0-9]/.test(passwordText)) score += 1;
if (passwordText && score < 2) {
callback(new Error('新密码需至少包含字母、数字、符号中的两类'));
return;
}
callback();
},
trigger: 'blur'
}
],
confirm_password: [
{ required: true, message: '请再次输入新密码', trigger: 'blur' },
@@ -1094,6 +1113,7 @@
},
mounted() {
document.querySelector('.app-container').classList.add('loaded');
this.loadSecurityStatus();
},
methods: {
normalizePath(path) {
@@ -1149,6 +1169,29 @@
window.location.href = '/logout';
});
},
loadSecurityStatus() {
// 登录后主动拉一次账号安全状态:
// 1. 若仍在使用默认/弱口令,这里会强制打开改密弹窗;
// 2. 这样用户不需要额外摸索入口,首次进入后台就能完成风险收敛。
axios.get('/api/auth/security_status')
.then((response) => {
const data = (response.data || {}).data || {};
if (data.force_password_change) {
this.passwordDialogLocked = true;
this.openPasswordDialog();
this.$alert('当前后台账号仍在使用默认或弱密码,请先修改密码后再继续操作。', '安全提示', {
confirmButtonText: '去修改',
showClose: false,
closeOnClickModal: false,
closeOnPressEscape: false,
type: 'warning'
}).catch(() => {});
}
})
.catch(() => {
// 安全状态获取失败时不阻塞页面使用,避免偶发接口异常影响整体后台。
});
},
openPasswordDialog() {
// 打开弹窗前重置表单,避免上次输入残留。
this.passwordDialogVisible = true;
@@ -1164,6 +1207,13 @@
}
});
},
handlePasswordDialogBeforeClose(done) {
if (this.passwordDialogLocked) {
this.$message.warning('当前账号需要先完成密码修改,暂时不能关闭该弹窗。');
return;
}
done();
},
submitPasswordChange() {
if (!this.$refs.passwordFormRef) {
return;
@@ -1182,6 +1232,7 @@
}
this.$message.success(data.message || '密码修改成功');
this.passwordDialogVisible = false;
this.passwordDialogLocked = false;
})
.catch((error) => {
let errorMsg = '修改密码失败,请稍后重试';

View File

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@
password: [{ required: true, message: '请输入密码', trigger: 'blur' }]
},
loading: false,
errorMessage: ''
errorMessage: {{ (error or '')|tojson }}
}
},
methods: {
@@ -323,23 +323,32 @@
const formData = new FormData();
formData.append('username', this.loginForm.username);
formData.append('password', this.loginForm.password);
fetch('/login', { method: 'POST', body: formData })
axios.post('/login', formData, {
headers: {
'X-Requested-With': 'XMLHttpRequest',
'Accept': 'application/json'
}
})
.then(response => {
if (response.redirected) {
window.location.href = response.url;
} else {
return response.text();
}
})
.then(html => {
if (html) {
this.errorMessage = '用户名或密码错误';
this.loading = false;
const data = response.data || {};
if (data.success && data.redirect_url) {
window.location.href = data.redirect_url;
return;
}
this.errorMessage = data.error || '登录失败,请稍后重试';
this.loading = false;
})
.catch(error => {
console.error('登录出错:', error);
this.errorMessage = '登录请求失败,请稍后重试';
let errorMsg = '登录请求失败,请稍后重试';
try {
if (error && error.response && error.response.data && error.response.data.error) {
errorMsg = error.response.data.error;
}
} catch (e) {
// 读取错误详情失败时保留默认提示即可。
}
this.errorMessage = errorMsg;
this.loading = false;
});
}

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import re
import secrets
from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
@@ -24,6 +25,19 @@ class AdminAccountDBOperator(BaseDBOperator):
HASH_SCHEME = "pbkdf2_sha256"
# PBKDF2 迭代次数:在安全性与计算开销之间做平衡。
HASH_ITERATIONS = 150_000
# 风险口令清单:
# 1. 这里优先覆盖系统默认口令和常见极弱口令;
# 2. 后台安全判断只需要识别“明显危险”的情况,不追求做成完整密码字典;
# 3. 统一放在数据层,便于登录鉴权、修改密码、首登提醒共用。
RISKY_PASSWORDS = {
"admin",
"admin123",
"123456",
"12345678",
"password",
"qwerty",
"abot123",
}
def init_tables(self) -> bool:
"""初始化后台管理员表。
@@ -120,6 +134,44 @@ class AdminAccountDBOperator(BaseDBOperator):
(password_hash, str(username or "").strip()),
)
def is_using_risky_password(self, username: str) -> bool:
"""判断指定管理员是否仍在使用风险口令。"""
row = self.get_admin_by_username(username)
if not row:
return False
stored_hash = str(row.get("password_hash") or "")
if not stored_hash:
return False
# 口令是哈希存储的,因此只能把风险候选集逐个比对。
for candidate in self.RISKY_PASSWORDS:
if self.verify_password(candidate, stored_hash):
return True
return False
@classmethod
def validate_password_strength(cls, raw_password: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""校验密码强度,返回错误提示;通过时返回 None。"""
password_text = str(raw_password or "")
if len(password_text) < 8:
return "新密码长度不能少于8位"
if password_text.lower() in cls.RISKY_PASSWORDS:
return "新密码过于简单,请避免使用默认口令或常见弱口令"
score = 0
if re.search(r"[A-Za-z]", password_text):
score += 1
if re.search(r"\d", password_text):
score += 1
if re.search(r"[^A-Za-z0-9]", password_text):
score += 1
# 至少满足两类字符,既兼顾安全性,也避免把规则设得过于苛刻。
if score < 2:
return "新密码需至少包含字母、数字、符号中的两类"
return None
@classmethod
def hash_password(cls, raw_password: str) -> str:
"""生成口令哈希。
@@ -163,4 +215,3 @@ class AdminAccountDBOperator(BaseDBOperator):
return hmac.compare_digest(actual_digest, expected_digest)
except Exception:
return False

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
- 已在后台首页补充“系统健康快照”,可集中查看机器人连接、插件运行、近 24 小时异常与 md2img 运行状态
- 已补充 MySQL / Redis 连接探测与统一 LLM 最近调用快照,基础设施与 AI 运行态可直接在首页查看
- 已将 `trace_id` 通过异步上下文继续贯穿到统一 LLM 调用与微信发送动作,链路追踪粒度进一步提升
- 已补充后台登录失败限流、会话超时、默认弱口令强提醒与密码复杂度校验,后台安全基线进一步收紧
## 2. 项目现状判断
@@ -260,6 +261,12 @@
- 提高后台管理面的安全基线
当前进展:
- 第一阶段已完成:已补充登录失败限流、会话超时、安全 Cookie 与动态 secret_key 兜底
- 第二阶段已完成:已补充默认弱口令识别、登录后强制改密提示与密码复杂度校验
- 后续可继续补充关键操作审计日志与更细粒度的管理员行为追踪
建议内容:
- 首次部署强制修改默认管理员密码